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Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas & Oil Company, et al.,
decided by the United States District Court for the Central Division of
California on March 17, 1971 (not reported at this writing), is of interest to
international lawyers because of the Court's application of the act-of-state
doctrine in an anti-trust proceeding involving activities of foreign govern-
ments.
The suit by Occidental and a wholly owned subsidiary was for treble
damages under the Sherman Act, as the result of an alleged conspiracy to
deprive them of a significant part of their offshore oil concession in the
Persian Gulf, granted by the Trucial State of Umm al Qaywayn. It was
charged that the defendants had induced foreign governments to extend
adjacent territorial waters to prevent plaintiffs from drilling on their con-
cession and to create a dispute regarding boundaries.
Plaintiffs claimed to have suffered one hundred million dollars in dam-
ages, and demanded three times this amount on the ground that the action
complained or constituted an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act
in restraint of the foreign commerce of the United States. The Court
dismissed the complaint on the authority of American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), holding that the act-of-state doc-
trine, applied by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), "bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from
foreign sovereign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendant."
Shortly after Buttes had itself failed in its bid to obtain the concession
granted to Occidental, Buttes obtained an offshore concession from the
neighboring Trucial State of Sharjah. This included the island of Abu Musa
located 38 miles off the coast of Sharjah. Plaintiffs alleged that, at the time
that the Buttes concession was granted, Sharjah claimed territorial waters
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of no more than three miles, and that it was subsequently induced by
Buttes to extend its claim to 12 miles for the purpose of appropriating a
part of the Occidental concession where Occidental was preparing to drill
on a promising prospect. It was also claimed that defendants had "induced
and procured the National Iranian Oil Company to assert at this time that
the island of Abu Musa was Iranian territory." Iran claimed territorial
waters of 12 miles.
Although the British Government, which at the time exercised control
over the foreign relations of the Trucial States, initially rejected the asser-
tions of Sharjah that the Occidental concession encroached upon Sharjah
territory, it later intervened to prevent Occidental from drilling in the
disputed area. The plaintiffs claimed that their seagoing equipment "was
boarded under force by the British Royal Navy" and that the home of the
Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn was "buzzed by airplanes of the British Royal
Air Force and surrounded by British soldiers." In these circumstances, the
Ruler directed the plaintiffs not to drill in the area claimed to be within the
territorial waters of Sharjah and Iran. Both Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn
agreed to refer their claims to a mediator appointed by the British Govern-
ment.
All but one of Buttes' defenses were dismissed. The Court held that the
complaint alleged sufficient effect on United States foreign commerce to
provide subject-matter jurisdiction; that the case would not require "an
explicit or implicit adjudication" of the rights of foreign States to the
disputed area, a determination of foreign boundaries being a task which the
Court could not pursue; that foreign States were not indispensable parties;
that the charge of inducing and procuring executive acts by foreign govern-
ments was not beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court under
Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961); but that the Court was barred from adjudicating the
claims by the act-of-state doctrine. As regards this last defense, the Court
held that the doctrine did not deprive it of jurisdiction, but it did require a
finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Although the plaintiffs argued that they did not complain of the acts of
foreign States, but only of the defendants' conduct in "catalyzing" such
acts, the Court pointed out that they had dubbed such States as
"co-conspirators" and had thus questioned their conduct under the
anti-trust laws. An inquiry into such conduct, the Court said, was surely
barred by the act-of-state doctrine. The contention that several of Sharjah's
acts were violative of international law was also barred by the doctrine, the
Court said, adding "specifically by the Sabbatino decision."
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Furthermore, because a private anti-trust claim requires proof of damage
resulting from forbidden conduct, plaintiffs were asking the Court to "sit in
judgment" upon the sovereign acts pleaded, whether or not the countries
involved were considered co-conspirators. The plaintiffs would have to
prove that Sharjah had issued a fraudulent territorial-waters decree, and
that Iran had laid claim to the island of Abu Musa at the behest of the
defendants. Although the plaintiffs insisted that they were ready to prove
the former allegation by use of "internal documents," the Court pointed
out that such inquiries into the authenticity and motivation of the acts of
foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and
complication that the act-of-state doctrine is aimed to avert.
The plaintiffs contended, however, that the doctrine had been "sapped of
its vitality and rationale by the so-called 'Sabbatino Amendment.' " After
pointing out that by its terms this amendment is "extremely narrow," and
that in all other cases the act-of-state doctrine "remains the law of the
land," the Court concluded that plaintiffs' assertion that the amendment "in
effect pulled the rug out from under the act of state doctrine in all cases"
was groundless. Moreover, the amendment applied only to a "confiscation
or other taking," whereas the plaintiffs had only alleged an "attempted
confiscation" in this case.
It is also of interest that the plaintiffs argued that Sharjah and Umm al
Qaywayn could not qualify as States under the act-of-state doctrine be-
cause they had delegated to Great Britain ultimate authority over their
foreign relations. Citing the Zeiss case (293 F.Supp. 892, aff'd., 433 F.2d
686), the Court said that "application of act of state to the Trucial States
would appear to follow a fortiori." Previously recognized as independent
sovereigns by Great Britain, these States had ceded supervision of their
foreign relations only by a series of treaties. Whatever their international
status might be, "their degree of international personality is obviously
greater than that, say, of Wuerttemberg." Nor was the Court's conclusion
that the doctrine applies to the Trucial States disturbed, as regards Sharjah,
by the assertion that some of the conduct of its Ruler was motivated by his
own gain and benefit. The Court was satisfied that at all times he acted in
his official capacity and on behalf of his State.
It does not appear from this interesting decision where the mediation of
the boundary dispute now stands, or how Iran's claims are being met.
Clearly the situation is a difficult one; but at least the activities.of the
governments concerned are beyond the reach of our anti-trust laws.
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